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ABSTRACT 
This paper examines the impact of government spending on the environment using a 
panel of 77 countries for the time period 1980-2000.  We estimate both the direct 
effect of government spending on pollution and the indirect effect which operates 
through government spending impact on per capita income and the subsequent effect 
of income level on pollution. In order to take into account the dynamic nature of the 
relationships examined, appropriate econometric methods are used. For both sulfur 
dioxide and carbon dioxide, government spending is estimated to have a negative 
direct impact on per capita emissions. The indirect effect on sulfur dioxide is found 
to be negative for low levels of income and then becomes positive as income level 
increases, while it remains negative for carbon dioxide for the whole income range of 
the sample. The resultant total effects follow the patterns of the indirect effects, 
which dominate their respective direct ones for each pollutant. Policy implications, 
occurring from the paper’s results, range according to the level of income of the 
considered countries. 
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1. Introduction 
Government expenditure has recently expanded in many countries, as an 
attempt to alleviate the adverse effects of the 2008 financial and the subsequent 
economic crisis. Most importantly, a large fraction of a nation’s gross domestic 
product is spent by its government, with a direct impact on different sectors of an 
economy and society. In addition environmental protection is an area where the 
private sector has little incentives to invest (Lopez et. al., 2011). However, despite 
the important influence that public spending may have on the environment, their 
relationship has not been studied extensively in the literature and has only recently 
started drawing attention.  
The effects of government spending on the environment may be classified as 
direct and indirect. In particular, the indirect effect operates through the impact of 
government spending on economic growth and the subsequent relationship between 
income level and pollution known as Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC) 
hypothesis. 
Ecological Economics emphasize that the natural environment has an 
aggregate carrying capacity, which sets a constraint on the maximum sustainable 
level of economic activity.  The level of the current output of an economy in relation 
to its maximum environmentally sustainable level and the occurring effect of an 
expansionary fiscal policy on economic activity, are important factors to consider 
when examining the effect of government expenditure on pollution. Heyes (2000) 
suggests an augmented Keynesian model that incorporates such a macro-
environmental constraint. Abstracting possible factors that could alter the 
environmental constraint, Heyes concludes that any policy that causes a higher 
interest rate, like an expansionary fiscal policy, induces substitution towards more 
environmentally intensive methods of production and thus must be accompanied by a 
lower aggregate income, if environmental equilibrium is to be sustained.  
In an attempt to explicitly address the return to equilibrium, Lawn (2003) 
proposes the use of tradable resource permits when output exceeds the 
environmentally sustainable level, for example as the result of an expansionary fiscal 
policy. As prices for permits increase, reflecting increased demand, the cost of 
production also increases, generating a contractionary monetary policy that reduces 
the output level. However, higher resource costs lead to the development of resource-
saving technological progress. Thus, the resulting level of output depends on whether 
the falling costs, due to technological progress, are sufficient to prevent goods prices 
from rising. In a related paper, Sim (2006) argues that, following an expansionary 
fiscal policy, the return to equilibrium is triggered by excessive pollution and 
increased environmental degradation that inflict greater costs to society which lower 
planned expenditure until the level of output returns to its environmentally 
sustainable level.  
The estimated sign of the direct effect of government size on pollution is 
indefinite in the empirical literature. Frederik and Lundstrom (2001) investigate the 
effect of political and economic freedom on the level of CO2 emissions, using a panel 
data set of 75 countries for the period 1975-1995. They find that the effect of 
government size on levels of pollution differs according to the initial government 
size. In particular, increased economic freedom, in terms of lower government size, 
decreases CO2 emissions when the size of government is small but increases 
emissions when the size is large.  
According to Bernauer and Koubi (2006) an increase of the government 
spending share of GDP is associated with more air pollution and this relationship is 
not affected by the quality of the government. However, they do not consider 
quadratic or cubic terms of income in their analysis and they ascribe their finding to 
the ambiguous hypothesis that higher income leads to both bigger government and 
better air quality. 
More recently, Lopez et. al. (2011) provide a theoretical basis for determining 
the effect of government expenditure on pollution. Specifically, they stress the 
importance and estimate empirically the impact of fiscal spending composition on 
the environment. They argue that a reallocation of government spending composition 
towards social and public goods reduces pollution. This result is attributed to the 
combination of four factors occurring from such a shift, namely the scale (increased 
environmental pressures due to more economic growth), composition (increased 
human capital intensive activities instead of physical capital intensive industries that 
harm the environment more), technique (due to higher labor efficiency) and income 
(where increased income raises the demand for improved environmental quality) 
effects.  
Moreover, they find that increasing total government size, without changing 
its orientation, has a non-positive impact on environmental quality. However, in a 
related study, Lopez and Palacios (2010) examine the role of government 
expenditure and environmental taxes1 on environmental quality in Europe using 
disaggregated data for 21 European countries for the period 1995-2006 and report 
total government expenditure as a negative and significant determinant of air 
pollution, even when controlling for the composition of public expenditure.  
As mentioned above, the indirect mechanism through which the share of 
government expenditure of GDP may influence pollution depends on both the 
                                                          
1 For an extended study of the impact of environmental taxes on pollution the reader may refer to 
Fullerton et. al. (2010).  
income - pollution and government - growth relationships.  A review of the literature 
on the former relationship, categorized according to the factors that are regarded as 
the most important in determining the inverted-U shape of the EKC, is provided by 
Halkos (2003). 
The majority of the studies examining the government size – growth 
relationship find a negative impact of the former on the latter. Increasing public 
expenditure may deteriorate economic growth by crowding-out the private sector, 
due to government inefficiencies, distortions of the tax and incentives systems and 
interventions to free markets (Barro, 1991; Bajo-Rubio, 2000; Afonso and Furceri, 
2008). In addition, the share of government expenditure dedicated to the increase of 
the productivity of the private sector is typically smaller in countries with big 
governments (Folster and Henrekson, 2001).  
Furthermore, related papers by Bergh and Karlsson (2010) and Afonso and 
Jalles (2011) find that government size correlates negatively with growth and support 
that countries with big governments can use improvements in institutional quality 
and globalization to mitigate this negative effect. On the other hand, government 
expenditure may also have a positive effect on economic performance, due to 
positive externalities by harmonizing conflicts between private and social interests, 
providing a socially optimal direction for growth as well as offsetting market failures 
(Ghali, 1998). 
Our paper estimates the direct, indirect and total effects through which 
government expenditure influences the environment. For that reason, a two equation 
model was jointly estimated, employing a sample of 77 countries and covering the 
period 1980-2000 for two air pollutants, sulfur dioxide (SO2) and carbon dioxide 
(CO2). The analysis takes place up to the year 2000 because of limited availability of 
data on SO2 after this period. Consequently, for reasons of comparability we also 
perform the analysis for CO2 for the same time period. In doing so we take particular 
care to consider the dynamic nature of the relationships examined, employing 
appropriate econometric methods for the estimation of dynamic panels, for the first 
time in this area of research. To the best of knowledge there is no other paper that 
distinguishes between the direct and indirect impact of fiscal spending on the 
environment. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows; section 2 presents the 
data used in the analysis and section 3 discusses the econometric models proposed in 
the study. The empirical results are reported in section 4 while the final section 
concludes the paper.  
2. Data 
Our sample consists of 77 countries2 which have a full set of sulfur dioxide, 
carbon dioxide, share of government expenditure, GDP per capita and other 
explanatory variables information for the period 1980-2000. The database consists of 
1,617 observations per variable3. In particular, Government expenditure data are 
obtained from the Penn World Table and refer to the government consumption share 
of PPP converted GDP per capita at constant prices, in particular the share of GDP 
which is left after consumption, investment and net exports are taken into account in 
any given year.  
                                                          
2Data are for the following countries: 
Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Cape 
Verde, Chile, China, Colombia, Cuba, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Rep, Equador, Egypt, El 
Salvador, Finland, France, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Honduras, Hong Kong, Hungary, 
India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Lebanon, Liberia, Mauritius, 
Mexico, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, 
Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Sierra Leone, South Africa, South 
Korea, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad, Tunisia, 
Turkey, Uganda, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Venezuela 
3 Table A1 of the Appendix provides data sources and descriptions for all variables. Table A2 presents 
summary statistics of the data.  
In order to avoid dependence of results on geographic location characteristics 
and atmospheric conditions, emissions of the two pollutants were used rather than 
their concentrations. The main sources of SO2 and CO2 pollutants are electricity 
generation and industrial processes. High concentrations of sulfur dioxide in the 
atmosphere can result in respiratory illness, alterations in human lung defense and 
aggravation of existing cardiovascular disease. Sulfur dioxide is among the major 
precursors of acid rain, which has acidified soils, lakes and streams with harmful 
effects on plants and animals and accelerated corrosion of buildings and monuments. 
Before-, during- and after- combustion technologies could be used to remove sulfur. 
The applicability requirements, the abatement efficiencies, the capital and operating 
and maintenance costs of each possible abatement option, as well as an estimate of 
their cost effectiveness are presented in Halkos (1995). 
An important distinction between the two pollutants that has to do with their 
atmospheric life characteristics is their geographical range of effect (Cole, 2007). 
Considering that two-thirds of sulfur dioxide moves away from the atmosphere 
within 10 days after its emission, its impact is mainly local or regional and thus, 
historically, sulfur has been subject to regulation. In contrast, carbon has not been 
regulated, since its atmospheric life varies from 50 to 200 years and hence its impact 
is global rather than local.  
3. Methodology 
In this paper we estimate both the direct and indirect effects of the share of 
government expenditure of GDP on pollution by employing a similar empirical 
strategy to that used by Welsch (2004) and Cole (2007) in investigating the effect of 
corruption on pollution. The model comprises two equations that are jointly 
estimated, one being a usual formulation of the EKC, augmented with government 
expenditure and other factors and the second expressing income as a function of 
government expenditure and other factors. In particular,  
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where subscripts i and t represent country and time respectively and all variables are 
expressed in natural logarithms, unless otherwise stated.  
Equation (1) represents a cubic EKC augmented with the share of 
government expenditure over income along with a standard vector of other 
explanatory variables that include the share of investment over income, as a proxy 
for capital stock, and the share of trade over GDP in order to examine whether 
involvement in international trade affects pollutants. Because the impact of 
government expenditure may not occur instantaneously, we use the lagged share of 
government consumption expenditure, which may also mitigate the bias from reverse 
causality. i∂   is a country effect which can be fixed or random, tζ  is a time effect 
common to all countries and itε  is a disturbance term with the usual desirable 
properties.  
Equation (2) is an augmented Solow model widely used in the growth 
literature (Mankiw et al., 1992; Barro, 1998). It expresses income as a function of the 
share of government expenditure of GDP and other explanatory factors like 
investment and education as proxies for capital and human stock, population growth, 
inflation rate in order to consider the impact of the macroeconomic environment and 
a measure of openness to international trade. Finally, iγ  and tδ  represent country 
and time effects respectively while itu  is an error term. 
 
3.1 Econometric issues and estimation 
In estimating Equations (1) and (2) we must take into account the unobserved 
heterogeneity across countries. The standard approach is to use the fixed effects and 
random effects model formulations, with the choice between the two versions 
depending on the assumption one makes about the likely correlation between the 
cross-section specific error component and the explanatory variables. When such 
correlation is present, then random effects estimators are not consistent and efficient 
and the use of fixed effects is more appropriate.  
For example, in the pollutants’ equations these country-specific 
characteristics may include differences in climate, geography and endowments of 
fossil fuels, all of them potentially correlated with emissions (Leitao, 2010). In 
addition, it is very likely that country unobserved characteristics are correlated with 
income and the other explanatory variables, suggesting that fixed effects estimation 
is preferred. This assumption is supported by the use of Hausman test statistics, 
where the random effect model was rejected in favor of the fixed effect model, for 
both equations (1) and (2). 
Since the balanced panel data used in this paper consists of both large N and 
large T dimensions non-stationarity is a critical issue. In addition, we should take 
into consideration the dynamic nature of our model. We are particularly concerned 
about the dynamic misspecification of the pollutants’ equations as pointed out by 
Halkos (2003). If we rely on a static model, then all adjustments to any shock occur 
within the same time period in which they take place, but this could only be justified 
if we have an equilibrium relationship or if the adjustment processes are very fast. 
According to Perman and Stern (1999), that is extremely unlikely to be the case and, 
on the contrary it is expected that the return to long-run equilibrium emission levels 
is a rather slow process.  
 In that context, in order to estimate a non-stationary dynamic panel we 
employ three alternative estimators developed by Pesaran and Smith (1995) and 
Pesaran et al. (1997, 2004). The first one is a dynamic fixed effects (DFE) estimation 
in which we assume that intercepts differ across countries but the long-run 
coefficients are equal across countries. However, if equality of the slope coefficients 
does not hold in practice this technique yields inconsistent estimators. These 
assumptions may be tested by the use of a Hausman test.  
An alternative estimation method that fits the model for each country 
individually and calculates the arithmetic average of the coefficients is the mean-
group estimator (MG). This method is less restrictive than DFE since intercepts, 
slope coefficients and error variances are all allowed to differ across countries. 
Finally, the pooled mean group (PMG) estimator combines the DFE and MG 
methods by allowing the intercept, short-run coefficients and error variances to differ 
across groups while assuming equality of the long-run coefficients. Martinez-
Zarzoso and Bengochea-Morancho (2004) applied the PMG estimator in order to test 
the existence of EKC for CO2 for a group of OECD countries and point to the 
existence of an N-shaped, cubic, EKC for the majority of those countries. 
For equation (1), adopting the formalization by Blackburne III and Frank 
(2007), we set up an initial general autoregressive-distributed lag model AD 
(p,q1,…,qk) of the form  
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where the number of countries 1, 2,...,i N= ; the number of periods 1, 2,...,t T= , for 
sufficiently large T; itX  is a 1k × vector of explanatory variables; and iµ  is a country-
specific effect.  
If the variables in equation (3) are integrated of order one, that is if they are 
I(1), and cointegrated, then the error term is an I(0) process for all i . A principle 
feature of cointegrated variables is their responsiveness to any deviation from the 
long-run equilibrium. Hence, it is possible to specify an error correction model in 
which deviations from the long-run equilibrium affect the short-run dynamics of the 
variables. We can then form the error correction equation as 
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Nonlinearity in the parameters requires that the models are estimated using 
maximum likelihood. The likelihood may be written as the product of each country’s 
likelihood, which expressed in logarithmic form, is 
[ ] [ ]' ' ' 2 2
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The main econometric concern for equation (2) is the possible bias occurring 
from the endogeneity between income and government spending. The exact 
relationship between GDP and government spending is an active area of research but 
there is empirical and anecdotal evidence that governments often alter the amount 
and composition of fiscal spending in order to deal with the effects of the business 
cycle.  
To address this reverse causality problem we use two different approaches, 
namely a Two Stage Least Squares (2SLS) generalization of panel data estimators 
and the Arellano - Bond (1998) Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) in order to 
also take into account dynamics. Our aim is to exploit an exogenous source of 
variation in the government spending share of GDP. To that end we use as 
instrumental variable the weighted average government spending in other countries, 
weighting by the inverse of the distance between the two countries4.  
The income level in a small country relative to the regional and world 
economy should have no effect on the government spending in these other countries, 
making the weighted average spending share of GDP elsewhere a good instrument 
for the local government spending share. An advantage of using the weighted 
average spending share of GDP in other countries as an instrument is that its lags can 
also be used as an instrument depending on the preferred exogeneity assumptions. 
Moreover, we are not restricted in using only a random effects specification as would 
be the case if we were employing time invariant instruments, which would prevent 
the potential correlation between country-specific effects and the explanatory 
variables. Finally, the Arellano-Bond GMM procedure accounts for the inertia that 
may exist in the determination of income. It mitigates also potential reverse causality 
biases by using both predetermined and exogenous variables as instruments in a 
systematic way. 
 
                                                          
4 Lee and Gordon (2005) used a similar approach in examining the effect of tax structure on economic 
growth. 
3.2 Capturing the effects of government expenditure on pollution 
Given the direct and indirect effects, the total effect of government spending 
on pollution can be expressed as follows 
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where the first expression is the direct effect and the latter is the indirect effect via 
government’s expenditure impact on prosperity. It should be noted that while the 
direct effect remains constant throughout the whole income range, the indirect and 
thus the total effect depend on the level of per capita income because of the inclusion 
of quadratic and cubic income terms in equation (1). In addition, also from equation 
(1), it occurs that the direct effect of government expenditure on pollution takes place 
in the next period rather than in the same year, since we use the lagged share of 
government consumption expenditure. In contrast, the indirect effect is 
contemporaneous.  
 
4. Results 
Table 1 presents the coefficient estimates of per capita income, Eq. (2), by 
applying different estimation methods. We use the Huber-White-Sandwich estimator 
of the variance-covariance matrix to estimate the standard error of the coefficients in 
order to account for autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity. All estimates yield 
negative and statistically significant effects for the government expenditure share of 
GDP, as expected, at the 1% level regardless of the method used.  
Instrumenting government share in the third column has the effect of 
increasing the magnitude of its coefficient. A Hansen test of overidentifying 
restrictions is reported5 which is asymptotically distributed as 2χ . The test fails to 
reject the null hypotheses that the instruments are uncorrelated with the error term 
and that the specification is correct.  The test does not reject the overidentifying 
restrictions and there is no evidence against the null that the instruments, as a group, 
are exogenous. In addition, the Cragg-Donald F-statistic of 153.23 is much greater 
than the Stock-Yogo weak ID test critical value at the 10% maximal IV size, 16.38, 
indicating that the instrument used is not weak. The estimates imply that increasing 
the share of government spending in GDP by 1%, holding all other explanatory 
variables constant, may result in a 0.799% reduction of per capita income.  
 
 Table 1: Econometric results of the impact of government share on per capita income 
Model OLS FE 2SLS GMM A-B DFE 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
Log government share      -0.144***    -0.216***    -0.799*** -1.350***    -0.888*** 
   (0.045) (0.069) (0.275)  (0.329) 
Log investment       0.820***    0.140*** 0.053  0.685*** 0.428* 
   (0.047) (0.038)   (0.068)  (0.226) 
Population growth      -0.256***    -0.013** -0.013*  -0.160***    -0.257*** 
  (0.039) (0.006)  (0.0069)  (0.078) 
Trade openness      0.002***   0.003***   0.003***  0.020*** 0.006* 
    (0.0005)   (0.0009) (0.001)   (0.0035) 
Constant      6.711***   8.485***    
  (0.252) (0.239)    
R2  0.473 0.1986    
F test 0.000 0.000 0.000   
Wald test    0.000  
Hausman FE v. RE  0.000    
Cragg-Donald F-stat   153.23   
Hausman PMG v. DFE     1.000 
Hansen test   0.410 0.118  
A-B test of AR(1)    0.000  
A-B test of AR(2)    0.062  
Nobs/Countries/IVs 1,617 1,617/77 1,540/77 1,463/77/60 1,540/77 
Note: Robust standard errors are in brackets. All tests’ values reported are probabilities. 
         *Significant at 10%. 
         **Significant at 5% 
         ***Significant at 1%. 
 
                                                          
5 The Sargan statistic is not reported since it is not robust and shows a tendency to over-reject when 
heteroskedasticity and/or autocorellation are present in the model (Arellano and Bond, 1991). 
In the fourth column, applying the Arellano-Bond two-step6 procedure GMM 
estimator, government share is still treated as endogenous but now dynamics are also 
taken into consideration. The significance of the lagged dependent variable (p-value 
= 0.000) suggests that the dynamic specification should be preferred. We report long-
run estimates, calculated by dividing each estimated short-run coefficient by one 
minus that short-run coefficient. The estimated impact of government expenditure on 
GDP is even greater in that case, suggesting that an increase of 1% in the share of 
government spending of GDP, ceteris paribus, reduces per capita income by 1.35%. 
To obtain robust standard errors the Windmeijer’s finite-sample correction for the 
two-step covariance matrix is used. We use the Arellano-Bond estimates as 
benchmarks, therefore subsequent analysis and the estimation of equation (1) is 
based on fitted values of real per capita income from the GMM estimation.  
It should be noted that in our analysis the assumption of uncorrelated itu  is 
important, so tests for first- and second-order serial correlation related to the 
residuals from the estimated equation are reported in column (4). These tests are 
asymptotically distributed as normal variables under the null hypothesis of no-serial 
correlation. The test for AR(1) is rejected as expected, while there is no evidence to 
suggest that the assumption of serially uncorrelated errors is inappropriate at least for 
the 1% and 5% significance levels.  
The estimates of the DFE method are presented in the fifth column. The 
estimated coefficient of government expenditure is still significant at the 1% level 
and equal to -0.888, suggesting that consideration of dynamics increases the 
estimated impact of government share on per capita income, even without accounting 
for endogeneity.  
                                                          
6 Since there is evidence of heteroskedasticity the more appropriate two-step version of Arellano-Bond 
procedure is applied.  
The signs and significance of the coefficients associated with the other 
control variables are all plausible and consistent with the literature. The impact of 
capital stock, represented by the share of investment in GDP, is positive and 
significant across all methods of estimation except from 2SLS. Population growth 
has a consistent negative and significant effect, while the coefficient of trade 
openness is also found to be significant and with the expected positive sign.  
We have also considered the use of years of schooling as a proxy for human 
capital and inflation in order to capture the macroeconomic environment, but they 
were both excluded from the final estimated model since they were not statistically 
significant and did not alter the parameter estimates of government expenditure and 
their importance7.  
Before turning to the estimation of per capita pollution emissions we should 
examine the time series properties of the main variables of the model. Testing for 
unit roots in panel data requires both the asymptotic behavior of the time series 
dimension, T, and the cross-section dimension, N, to be taken into consideration. 
Specifically, whether N and/or T converge to infinity is critical in determining the 
asymptotics of the unit root tests used in each case. The tests proposed by Hadri 
(2000), Breitung (2000) and Breitung and Das (2005) are based on a sequential limit, 
where first T tends to infinity for fixed N, and subsequently N tends to infinity. 
Harris and Tzavalis (1999) and Im et. al. (2003) suggest tests that are asymptotically 
normal for N→∞ and fixed T. Tests that may be employed when both 
N→∞ andT →∞ , are the ones proposed by Levin et al. (2002) and the Fisher-type 
tests assuming that the number of panels that do not have a unit root grow at the 
same rate as N.  
                                                          
7 The estimated impact of government share was also found to be robust to the incremental inclusion of 
the explanatory variables. 
 
Since the panel data set we examine consists of both N→∞ and T →∞  
dimensions, the tests of stationarity performed are based on the Fisher-type Phillips-
Peron unit root test. The test allows heterogeneity of the autoregressive parameter 
and although in its general form does not allow for cross-sectional dependence, it is 
more powerful than Levin et al. (2002) in that case8. Table 2 presents the results of 
the Phillips-Perron unit root tests on the variables of interest. As can be seen, there is 
evidence against stationarity in levels since in all cases our variables are I(1) i.e. they 
are stationary in first differences and non-stationary in levels for any level of 
statistical significance. 
 
Table 2:  Panel data unit root tests 
Variable no trend 
c-s means 
no trend 
minus c-s 
means 
with trend  
c-s means 
with trend 
minus c-s 
means  
Log SO2/c 0.063 0.763 0.367 0.526 
∆(Log SO2/c) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Log CO2/c 0.383 0.093 0.000 0.000 
∆(Log CO2/c) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Log Government share 0.821 0.511 0.464 0.527 
∆(Log Government share) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Log GDP/c 1.000 0.980 1.000 1.000 
∆(Log GDP/c) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
(Log GDP/c)2 1.000 0.998 1.000 1.000 
∆(Log GDP/c)2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
(Log GDP/c)3 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
∆(Log GDP/c)3 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Log Trade openness 0.924 0.022 0.345 0.137 
∆(Log Trade openness) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Note: Fisher-type Phillips-Perron unit root tests performed on each panel including one Newey-West 
lag.  All values reported are probabilities. C-s means stands for cross-sectional means. 
 
In addition, application of the DFE method requires that the variables 
included in the model are cointegrated i.e. there is a long-run relationship among 
                                                          
8 We also compute the mean of the series across panels and substract this mean from the series 
(columns 2 and 4 in Table 2), in order to mitigate the impact of cross-sectional dependence according 
to Levin, Lin, and Chu (2002) 
 
them. Table 3 presents the Pedroni Cointegration Tests for the two pollutants 
equations.  
 
Table 3:  Pedroni residual cointegration test 
 SO2/c CO2/c 
 Statistic Probability Statistic Probability 
Panel v-statistic 0.012 0.495 -1.120 0.869 
Panel rho-statistic 3.069 0.999 2.402 0.992 
Panel PP-statistic -1.850 0.032 -6.207 0.000 
Panel ADF-statistic -4.848 0.000 -5.200 0.000 
Group rho-statistic 4.461 1.000 4.781 1.000 
Group PP-statistic -8.207 0.000 -12.096 0.000 
Group ADG-statistic -6.802 0.000 -5.200 0.000 
 
For each pollutant, in four of the seven cases we reject the null hypothesis of 
no-cointegration at the conventional statistical significance level of 0.05. However, 
in terms of raw power of the statistics for relatively small values of T the rho and 
panel-v statistics are the most conservative and show a tendency to over-reject 
(Pedroni, 2004), suggesting that evidence of cointegration is even stronger than that 
depicted in Table 3.    
Table 4 provides the estimates of per capita pollution emissions utilizing the 
results of the GMM estimates of equation (2). For each pollutant we report both the 
FE and DFE estimates. In both models we used a proxy of capital stock and trade 
openness as control variables. Capital stock was not found to be statistically 
significant nor did it alter the main findings and hence has been excluded from the 
results in Table 4.  
It has already been mentioned that in our model, according to the Hausman 
test, FE is preferred to RE. Based on FE estimates (columns 1 and 3) the lagged 
government share of GDP is found to have a negative statistically significant direct 
effect on per capita SO2/c and a negative but not significant relationship with CO2/c. 
In addition, both pollutants have a statistically significant cubic relationship with per 
capita income while trade openness is found to be a negative determinant in both 
cases but significant only for per capita SO2. 
 
Table 4: Estimates of per capita pollution emissions 
     SO2/c CO2/c 
 FE DFE FE DFE 
Log government share lagged -0.327** -0.482* -0.100 -0.236* 
 (0.147) (0.246) (0.098) (0.124) 
Log GDPc -35.02** -63.98*** -20.14*** -16.26** 
 (16.52) (14.98) (6.669) (7.709) 
(Log GDPc)2 4.621** 8.429*** 2.620*** 2.119** 
 (2.110) (1.897) (0.788) (0.915) 
(Log GDPc)3 -0.198** -0.364*** -0.107*** -0.087** 
 (0.0890) (0.0796) (0.031) (0.0357) 
Log trade openess -0.188*** -0.135 -0.070 0.052 
 (0.0567) (0.126) (0.069) (0.071) 
Constant 82.64*  47.96**  
 (42.80)  (18.60)  
Error correction term   -0.213  -0.219 
  (0.072)  (0.032) 
Turning Points 685/8,342 831/6,088 489/25,109 501/22,471 
R2  0.170  0.395  
F test 0.000  0.000  
Hausman FE v. RE 0.001  0.000  
Hausman MG v. PMG  0.961  0.978 
Hausman MG v. DFE  1.000  1.000 
Nobs/Countries 1,540/77 1,463/77 1,540/77 1,463/77 
Note: Robust standard errors are in brackets. All tests’ values reported are probabilities. 
         *Significant at 10%. 
         **Significant at 5% 
         ***Significant at 1%. 
 
Dynamics are taken into account in the estimates reported in columns 2 and 4 
of Table 4. Since the DFE and PMG estimators constrain the long-run coefficients to 
be equal across all panels, this ‘pooling’ across countries yields efficient and 
consistent estimates when the restrictions are true and the true model is not 
heterogenous. The test of difference in these models is performed with the use of a 
Hausman test. Comparing the MG and PMG estimators we see that the PMG 
estimator, the efficient estimator under the null hypothesis, is preferred and thus 
pooling is more appropriate in our panel.  
However, before suggesting the DFE model as the more appropriate in that 
case, we should take into account the possible simultaneous equation bias from 
endogeneity between the error term and the lagged dependent variable, a condition 
that may be tested with the use of a Hausman test. Results indicate that the 
simultaneous equation bias is minimal in our panel and we conclude that the FE 
model is preferred over the MG model.   
Government share of income still possesses a negative relationship with 
SO2/c and CO2/c which is significant at the 0.052 and 0.058 significance levels 
respectively. A statistically significant cubic relationship is confirmed between the 
pollutants and per capita income. 
 Concentrating on DFE results, the estimated turning points of the EKC at its 
maximum (i.e. the level of income above which pollution declines) is within the 
sample for both pollutants, at $ 6,088 and $ 22,471 for SO2/c and CO2/c respectively 
and greater for CO2/c, a usual result in the literature. The estimated effect of trade 
openness on both pollutants is estimated to be negative but not statistically 
significant.  
As a side note, it is worth mentioning that the speed of adjustment rate for 
each pollutant is similar in magnitude and negative, implying an analogous return to 
long-run equilibrium values. 
Table 5 provides the direct, indirect and total effect of government share of 
GDP on pollution based on the FE and DFE estimates in Table 4. Since the indirect 
and thus the total effect depend on the level of income, the effects in Table 5 are 
calculated at the sample median level of income.  
 
 
Table 5: The impact of government spending on the pollutants (elasticities) 
 SO2/c CO2/c 
 FE DFE FE DFE 
Direct Effect -0.327 -0.482 -0.100 -0.236 
     
Indirect Effect -0.887 -0.660 -1.652 -1.361 
     
Total Effect -1.214 -1.142 -1.766 -1.579 
     
Change of sign point 9,738 7,094 27,770 28,912 
Note: The indirect effect is calculated at the sample median level of per capita income ($4703).  
 
A negative direct effect of government share of income on pollution is 
estimated by all models, as it has already been indicated by the results in Table 4. In 
detail, increasing the share of government spending of GDP by 1%, holding income 
and trade openness constant, may result in a 0.482% reduction of per capita SO2 
emissions and a 0.236% decrease in per capita CO2 emissions according to the DFE 
estimates.  The indirect effects are also negative at the median income level, leading 
to a negative total effect. The negative sign of the indirect effect occurs from the 
positive relationship between income and pollution at the median income level. 
Explicitly, at the median level of income, an increase in the government share of 
GDP leads to a reduction in income and, consequently, to a reduction in emissions. 
In addition, the estimated indirect effects are notably larger than the direct effects.  
Figures 1 and 2 show the direct, indirect and total effects of government share 
of income on emission levels against per capita income. For both pollutants the 
estimated direct effect is negative and constant for any income level. In contrast, the 
indirect effect increases with per capita income, since 
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falls from 0.36 to – 5.05 for SO2/c and from 0.68 to 0.03 for CO2/c 
throughout the sample income range. These patterns largely depend on the 
relationship between pollution and the income level described by the EKC.  
Consequently, the total effect of government share on SO2/c is negative for 
low levels of per capita income and then turns to positive. On the other hand, the 
total effect on CO2/c is also negative but becomes positive only for very high levels 
of income. Table 5 presents the estimated income level at which the total effect 
changes from negative to positive. In particular, DFE estimates indicate that this 
level is $ 7,094 for SO2/c and $ 28,912 for CO2/c i.e. the total effect of government 
share of income on CO2/c is negative through the whole sample income range. From 
the figures it becomes clear that the pattern of the total effect is determined by the 
shape of the indirect effect.  
 
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3
x 10
4
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Per Capita Income 
E
la
s
ti
c
it
y
 
 
Total
Direct
Indirect
 
                Figure 1: The effect of government share on SO2/c 
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                Figure 2: The effect of government share on CO2/c 
 
By further examining the results of Table 5, it becomes apparent that the 
estimated direct effect of government spending on pollution is considerably larger, in 
absolute values, for SO2 than CO2. That finding comes as no surprise when one takes 
into consideration both pollutants impact on human health as well as the 
technological capabilities of reducing their levels in the atmosphere and hence the 
environmental degradation associated with them. In particular, SO2 emission 
externalities are local and immediate while CO2 emission externalities are global and 
occur mostly in the future. Consequently, there are more incentives to incur the 
abatement costs associated with reduced SO2 emissions and thus SO2 is a pollutant 
that has been historically regulated to a larger extent than CO2. Moreover, existence 
of local environmental degradation, as in the case of SO2, increases demand for 
technological improvements to diminish that impact. On the other hand, when the 
cost of pollution is uncertain, more global and affects future generations relatively 
more, there is little demand for technological innovations that reduce environmental 
degradation (Shafik, 1994). As a result, substitution away from coal or high sulfur 
coal is easier than substitution away from fossil fuels mostly associated with CO2 
(Stern and Common, 2001). 
The difference in magnitude between the estimated direct effects of 
government expenditure on SO2 and CO2 could also be explained by how the 
different sectors of the economy respond to certain policies, as pointed out by Cole 
(2007), since industries and sectors that produce large quantities of SO2 per unit of 
output do not necessarily emit large quantities of CO2, and vice versa. However, the 
indirect effect of government share on emissions is larger for CO2 than SO2 since the 
former’s relationship with income has a greater positive slope over the sample 
income range than for SO2. 
 
4.2 Sensitivity analysis 
We have already seen that the estimates of government’s effect on both 
pollutants are robust across two different estimation approaches. In this section we 
further check the robustness of our results in order to confirm that the estimated 
coefficients are not dependent on particular model specifications and data points.  
We present the estimated total effect of government share on both pollutants 
as well as the level of income where this effect changes from negative to positive, 
when extreme observations are dropped from the analysis. Firstly, the model was 
estimated without the top and bottom 1% of government share expenditure data and 
then a similar approach was followed with the pollutant measures. Comparing the 
results on Table 6 with those of Table 5, it can be seen that the magnitude of the total 
effect and the estimate of the change of sign point are robust across the different 
datasets, indicating that the results are not determined by a small number of 
observations.  
Table 6: Robustness checks of the estimates on the total effect of government share                
on the pollutants 
  SO2/c  CO2/c 
 FE DFE FE DFE 
Bottom 1% of government share 
dropped 
-1.664 -0.721 -2.234 -2.169 
 (7,854) (5,766) (20,814) (25,694) 
Top 1% of government share 
dropped 
-1.598 -1.395 -2.391 -2.345 
 (9,406) (6,786) (25,806) (31,218) 
Bottom and top 1% of 
government share dropped 
-2.143 -1.110 -3.308 -3.168 
 (7,494) (5,866) (20,892) (25,352) 
Bottom 1% of pollutant dropped -1.138 -0.696 -1.648 -1.605 
 (8,904) (6,430) (23,720) (27,168) 
Top 1% of pollutant dropped -1.078 -1.024 -1.624 -1.577 
 (9,902) (7,266) (24,652) (29,128) 
Bottom and top 1% of pollutant 
dropped 
 
-1.023 
(9,218) 
-0.729 
(6,990) 
-1.639 
(23,648) 
-1.597 
(27,230) 
Democracy used as instrument -1.545 
(9,140) 
-1.303 
(6,674) 
-2.234 
(24,496) 
-2.118 
(28,300) 
Note: The indirect effect is calculated at the sample median level of per capita income ($4703).  
Effects presented are based on the DFE and FE estimations of the EKC equation. Change of sign 
points in parentheses. 
 
We also examine the sensitivity of the model to the instrumental variable 
used. We replace our strictly exogenous instrument for the government expenditure 
in the estimation of Eq. (2), with democracy. There are many empirical studies 
suggesting a relationship between public expenditure and the level of democracy in a 
country9. Boix (2003) suggests that a large share of the public sector depends on the 
level of democracy, while according to Aidt et al. (2006) cutting down socio-
economic restrictions to the voting system leads to larger public share of GDP, 
mainly through increasing spending on infrastructure and internal security. In another 
study, Martin and Plümper (2003) find that there is a U-shaped relationship between 
the level of political participation and the spending behavior of opportunistic 
governments. In particular they claim that for low levels of democratic participation, 
                                                          
9 It should be mentioned, however, that there is also a number of studies that find no causal relationship 
between democracy measures and public spending (see Profeta et al. 2010). 
government spending is high in order to meet the demand of rents by the elites while 
for high levels of democracy public spending is high due to growing demand for 
public goods. In contrast, none of these pressures relate to medium levels of political 
participation. In addition, there is a lack of sufficient empirical evidence about the 
existence of a significant relationship between income level and democracy (Barro, 
1996; Acemoglu et al., 2005). The results in the last row of Table 6 indicate that the 
estimation of the total direct effect is also robust to the use of a different instrumental 
variable in the model. 
5. Conclusions 
In this paper, we have used a sample of 77 countries for the period 1980-2000, in 
order to empirically test the impact of government size on pollution. For that reason, 
a two equation model was jointly estimated taking particular care to consider the 
dynamic nature of the relationships examined.  
The direct effect of government expenditure was found to be negative for 
both SO2 and CO2 per capita emissions and occurring with one year lag. Moreover, 
as a result of the relationship of income with the pollutants as well as with the 
government size, a contemporaneous indirect impact was also estimated. The 
estimated total effect is largely determined and follows the pattern of the more 
dominant indirect effect. In particular, for SO2, the total impact is negative, although 
decreasing in absolute value, for low levels of income and then becomes positive for 
more developed countries. In contrast, for CO2, the total effect was found to be 
negative and decreasing in absolute value for all levels of income in our sample. The 
reported results are robust to extreme observations dominance and to the use of an 
alternative instrumental variable for Eq. (2). 
The estimation of a non positive direct effect of government size on pollution 
is in line with recent findings by Lopez et. al. (2011) and Lopez and Palacios (2010). 
However, the estimation of the indirect effect is considered for the first time in this 
paper. Our results confirm the theoretical and empirical developments on the 
existence of a relationship between income and pollution as well between 
government size and economic performance.  
Policy implications, occurring from the paper’s results, differ according to the 
level of income of a country. For countries with GDP lower than $ 7,094, decreasing 
the government expenditure share of GDP tends to increase income but could also 
hinder environmental quality in terms of SO2 emissions. Since economic growth is 
an important factor for improving well-being and the results suggest that increases of 
government size are associated with the deterioration of economic performance, 
expansionary fiscal policies should be undertaken with particular care. In particular, 
in developing countries a cut in government expenditure should be undertaken 
together with the establishment of appropriate environmental regulation. However, in 
high income countries, a reduction of government size is found to be even more 
beneficial since it leads to improvements in both economic performance and 
environmental quality. These implications bear some resemblance to the EKC. In 
particular, countries with income level at the decreasing area of the EKC are more 
likely to have already established the environmental legislation and to have 
undertaken public expenditures for the improvement of environmental quality, thus 
they are susceptible to diminishing returns from a further increase in government 
size. On the other hand, when considering CO2 emissions with a more global 
ecological impact, a reduction of government expenditure leads to environmental 
degradation in all levels of income10, and should therefore be accompanied by 
appropriate legislation along with the establishment of international environmental 
treaties.  
APPENDIX 
Data description and sources 
Variable Description Source 
   
SO2/c Sulfur dioxide emissions per 
capita, thousands of metric 
tons of sulfur 
Stern(2005) 
CO2/c 
 
Carbon dioxide emissions per 
capita, metric tons of carbon 
Boden, Marland, Andres 
(2011) 
Government share Government share of Real GDP 
per capita 
Penn World Table(2009) 
GDPc GDP per capita (Constant US$ 
1990) 
Maddison(2010) 
Investment Investment share of Real GDP 
per capita 
Penn World Table (2009) 
Trade openess Share of imports and exports in 
GDP 
Penn World Table (2009) 
Population growth Annual growth rate of 
pupulation 
Maddison(2010) 
School Primary school enrollment (% 
gross) 
World Bank(2011) 
World government share Weighted avarage of 
government share of Real GDP 
per capita in other countries 
Authors’ calculations 
Democracy Degree of democracy, scaled      
-10 to 10 
Polity IV(2010) 
 
Summary statistics of variables used in the estimations, 1990 values 
Variables Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
SO2/c (thousands of metric tons) 0.0147 0.0188 0.00044 0.11288 
CO2/c (metric tons) 1.208 1.222 0.0091 5.3197 
Government share (%) 17.278 8.870 4.082 54.279 
GDPc ($1990) 7,312 6,502 585 23,201 
Investment(%) 21.332 10.425 4.13 48.93 
Trade openess(%) 63.979 40.337 10.185 252.609 
Population growth(%) 1.523 2.091 -12.249 8.051 
School(%) 98.625 17.240 35.833 140.924 
World government share(%) 18.094 2.395 15.785 30.632 
Democracy (-10 to 10) 4.176 6.698 -9 10 
 
                                                          
10 All levels of income of countries included in our sample. 
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